Thinking Thoughts

In the last paper that I wrote for my undergraduate education, I wrote on the mind-body problem. How are the mind and the body connected? How do they interact with each other? However, while that might be the heart of the problem, for me, it raised other questions. In the paper I conclude that the mind arises from the physical processes of the brain and that there are emergent properties which are created in the mind which would not necessarily be predicted in the simple physical processes. So from this conclusion, I wonder how some thoughts and feelings are created.

Are there thoughts or ideas that can then be created by the emergent properties of the mind and not be directly traced back to physical causes?
How do you understand thoughts that are not directly caused by physical means?
What are some examples of these thoughts?
Could one example be how do we miss someone?

As humans, we naturally believe ourselves to be better than other creatures and thus like to believe that we are the only animals to have some of the cognitive abilities that we have. It is these abilities that we would naturally like to apply to the emergent properties of the mind. I wonder whether this is actually true or not. It is interesting to wonder what thoughts we have that might be created by other thoughts.

I want to explore missing someone. We have thoughts about a person, different feelings, experiences, memories, opinions, ect. But it is not these that actually make us miss them. There are thoughts about these are thoughts. What is it to miss someone, a wish for someone to be with or near you? How long does it take for a person to be gone to miss them? Can you miss someone who is with you? When you miss a person, you have a wish or a desire for that person which is not fulfilled. We may assume that there could be a biological basis behind having thoughts about wanting something and feeling bad for not having that thing. However with a person, I think that there is so much more. There is reflection and thinking about that person which brings to mind the reasons why you may miss them. When thinking about these reasons, and realizing that the impetus of those memories or thoughts isn't there creates a feeling of loss. So while I concluded that the mind arises from the brain, it appears that there are emergent properties of the mind that can inturn interact with the brain. It is interesting how these good thoughts and memories when combined with a person not being there can make someone feel not as good, to make them feel that the miss someone.

I'll end this post by attaching my paper...

Bridging the Mind/Body Gap?

The mind-body problem may be one of the oldest problems in the philosophy of the mind. In its most general form, the problem arises from the description of the relationship between the mind and the body (brain). Generally philosophers have gone one of two ways, by claiming either a physical or nonphysical connection in this relationship. Theses answers to the question of how the brain and mind interact are broadly addressed by dualism (nonphysical), monism (physical) and phenomenology (focuses on experience). At stake to answering the question of the mind-body problem are consequences to how we frame and answer questions related to what is a person/what is an identity, do we have free will, and what is the self. In the hundreds of years, since Descartes formally posed this question, many theories have proposed solution to the problem. Dualism (as an umbrella term for related theories), favored by Descartes, monism (including the physical theories) and phenomenological theories have been proposed as solutions to the problem. However, none of these alone provide a satisfactory answer to the question nor resolve the problem. It is proposed here, however, that an explanation of the mind-body problem does exist. By first recognizing a linguistics problem in the way that the problem is posed and then adopting an emergent biological naturalistic approach to the problem, we find a theory, “eliminative materialism,” which is both satisfactory and that resolves the problem.
When a theory is described as “satisfactory” and “resolving” one must be careful to describe the connotations and implications of what that means. Here satisfactory is taken to mean that the theory is not perfect in all respects, however, as a whole, or along the right lines the theory is correct. Resolving is thus taken to mean that a straightforward solution is provided by the theory at hand. The previous theories proposed as solutions have their respective supporters and doubters, but they all have flaws and problems that do not make them the best candidate for solving the mind-body problem. Although the theory here may have its doubters, it provides a concrete and realistic explanation of how the mind and body relate.
The main issue or contention with the mind-body problem is not definitively how the mind and body relate, but in whatever way that they do meet, how does this affect other parts of life and person. There are many different subjects that are discussed in the philosophy of the mind, including but not limited to, death, perception, personhood, emotion, free will and the self. When adopting a certain frame of the mind-body problem, certain restraints are placed upon you in how you view and perceive these related topics. It is difficult to adopt a position and be able to defend all parts of what we often hold special as humans with just that position. The variety of theories of the mind-body problem appear to have various tradeoffs based on their strengths and weaknesses in describing the relationship at interest. The problem of the mind-body problem appears to be that as humans, we want our cake and to eat it to. This anthropocentric view of human kind as being special beings means that we want everything to work as we wish it. Man wants to consider himself special, as he is the only one to be born or possess this special characteristic of consciousness, unwilling to assign it to creatures or objects, not like himself. Most people believe that they want to be responsible for the choices that they make, that they know that other people are themselves conscious and that it is not through a serious of miracles that we live our everyday lives.
Specifically related to free will, it is generally contested that monists (who view the mind and body as arising from the same substance) follow a path which leads to determinism, which states that decisions are determined by natural laws, which would indicate that people are not free (in their decision making). Dualists on the other hand, view the mind and body as separate thus allowing for the mind to act independent of the body and thus act upon it. However, if the mind is separate from the body, and the mind only interacts with one specific body, how do we know that other people are conscious creatures like ourselves? Phenomenology on the other hand, brackets the questions that are largely at stake in the mind-body problem and instead attempts to offer an objective description of experiences. So until this point it appears when choosing a theory of the mind-body problem, one has to be mindful of the tradeoffs made in choosing a certain theory. The following theory proposes satisfactorily a resolution to the mind-body problem.
Since each attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters substantial problems, it is of contention that perhaps there is a misunderstanding of the conceptual framework of the problem. It is perhaps not a “problem” it may be that the mind and body are the same thing, not necessarily in the ways described in monism, but in that the human experience can be described in metal and physical terms. It becomes a problem when the descriptions are used interchangeably or in the field opposite of where they should describe. This view is similar to the mind-brain identity theory in that the mind and brain are viewed as two sides of the same token. The example of sense (mental) and reference (physical) is used to describe this theory.
At this point in the theory we understand that the mental and physical are two sides to the same concept. However, it is the contention of this theory that it is the physical from which the mental emerges. Here one might confuse this point as Hasker’s middle way, “emergent dualism”, however, it is actually the inverse, “emergent materialism.” One can view the conscious from the top down or the bottom up. In the first of many analogies, a fire can be viewed from above and be seen as smoke, which is analogous to the mental states, or one can view a fire from the ground and see it as a fire, the physical. Many have heard the phase, “there is no smoke without a fire,” and in this analogy, it means that there can be no mental states without the physical. While this does not directly go back the other way, the physical does depend on the mental states which are them selves physical. By not placing the mental outside of the realm of the physical, it can be stated that the mental and physical interact. Another analogy for emergentism is that of water. When hydrogen and oxygen gases combine to form liquid water, new properties emerge that would not have been predicted from the materials that it emerged from. Thus the physical properties of the brain give rise to the mental states.
In Hasker’s middle way he decides to reject materialism, stating that materialism cannot account for a unity of consciousness if consciousness is simply neurons firing synchronously. However, in this present theory, biological materialism is fully supported. It is the view of this theory that mental phenomena are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain and that the brain is able to produce intentionality. Although the process about how this occurs is not exactly known, it should not be assumed that we will never know. McGinn states that we cannot resolve the mystery of the mind-brain problem. Although he too supports a naturalistic approach to how consciousness arises, he claims that cognitive closure does not allow us to ever fully grasp the mind-body connection (more on this later). Two propositions for how consciousness arises are proposed in the present theory. In one view, there is a specific coalition of neurons which act and fire in a specific way for stimuli both in the environment and internally. In the other view, neurons in the brain fire in synchrony and assemble to arise as a cohesive units from moment to moment while incorporating feedback from the body.
It is the argument of this essay that “emergent materialism” is a theory that is sufficient and resolves the mind-body problem. To summarize the argument of the theory, one should be reminded of the three parts that compose the theory. First, “emergent materialism” states that there is a linguistic problem with how the mind-body problem is stated and that from this linguistic problem arises a misunderstanding in how questions and answers are framed. Second, a materialist position is taken in this theory, meaning that it is believed that the mind arises from the physical brain. This point leads to the last point of the theory. The actions that produce the mind, produce an emergent property of the mind which is different from the properties which are actually creating the mind. The mind and its emergent properties then feedback and affect the properties and materials that give rise to it.
Any time that a new theory is proposed in any realm, it is often met with skepticism, and it will be the point of the rest of the essay to explain how this theory is better than the other theories of mind and also how it satisfactorily resolves the mind-body problem. When considering the other theories of mind, the author first rejects the notion of any theory that has dualist notions. Dualism fails to resolve the problem because its answer is fielded in an area which can neither be confirmed nor rejected. By placing the possibilities of an answer outside of the physical realm, where measurements and observations cannot be made, we can neither confirm nor deny the correctness of this theory. This makes the theory unsatisfactory as an explanation when its validity cannot be tested. While “eliminative materialism” takes a materialist approach to addressing the mind-body problem, it does not necessarily agree with the other materialist theories. They were insufficient in their attempts to explain the problem and also generally were met with criticism for not addressing free will. Lastly, the author will not address the phenomenological approach to the mind-body problem. This approach “brackets out” the questions at hand and instead concerns itself with the description of our experience. When the theory does not concern itself with the question at hand, the relationship of the mind and body, the author does not find as a sufficient explanation of the problem.
With the rejection of these theories, similar criticisms may be stated against “eliminative materialism,” however, the theory stands up to the criticism. Since the theory is rooted in materialism, the same criticisms of materialism should be addressed for this theory. The most common criticism of materialism is the failure to acknowledge and account for free will. The present theory addresses these through the terminology of emergentism. Since the mind emerges from the brain, and through this process of emergentism gains properties which are not of the physical properties that create the mind. It is through this creation process that the mind gains the possibility to have free will. This is now a physical explanation that is not deterministic which accounts for free will and does not use dualist notions of the physical and non-physical interacting. One other objection to the theory is that we do not know the exact methods by which the brain creates the mind. This issue is addressed by McGinn who states that we will cannot grasp how the mind and body are connected. He states that cognitive closure prevents us from ever knowing how the mind works. However, to state that we will never no something is an interesting way to address the problem. By stating that the problem exists in the physical world, we are aware that we have the tools and the knowledge to measure the necessary variables included in consciousness. While the exact way that the mind and body are connected is not yet known, it is the impression of the author that this problem will be addressed soon.
In conclusion, it is proposed that “emergent materialism” is the theory that satisfactorily resolves the mind-body problem. Where other theories are faced with various criticisms for not satisfactorily answering the question at hand nor taking into account some of the consequences of how the mind-body problem is answered, “emergent materialism” faces the criticisms and is able to account for the consequences of how it frames the answer. By placing the mind and body as two sides to the same concept, the theory is able to argue for the justification of a materialist position of how the mind arises from the brain. The debate of how free will is then dealt with is acknowledged through the use of emergentism of the mind from the brain in which new properties are created when the physical properties of the brain combine to form the mind. This theory appears to fill in the holes present in past attempts to solve the mind-body problem. While the exact properties of how the mind arises from the physical brain are not yet know, research is on the doorstep to understanding how these relate.